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 Abstract  This chapter explores the experience of private-sector participation (PSP) 
in the provision of water and sanitation services since the late 1980s. In particular, 
it examines the various justifications for PSP, including that PSP would be inher-
ently more efficient than public water utilities, contribute to reduce the public 
sector’s deficit by providing fresh private investment, help to extend coverage of 
services to the poor, and improve social equity. The chapter finds that these claims 
are not supported by the evidence emerging from cases in Africa, Europe, and 
Latin America where PSP was strongly promoted. Not only have the promises of 
overall improvements in efficiency, fresh private investment, public sector relief, 
and extended service to the poor not materialized, but there are also good reasons 
to link the expansion of PSP with rising levels of social inequality and the weaken-
ing of democratic governance and substantive citizenship in the management of 
water and water services. The chapter also argues that achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals will require a radical change in policy options and a stronger 
commitment from OECD governments, international financial institutions, donors, 
and other key actors to strengthen public utilities, in particular at the regional and 
municipal level. 
 Chapter 9 
 Private-Sector Participation in Water and 
Sanitation Services: The Answer to Public 
Sector Failures?1 
 José  Esteban Castro 
 
1I wish to thank the International Food Policy Research Institute for the kind invitation to partici-
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University during 2001–2004. 
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 9.1  Introduction2 
 This chapter examines what we term the ‘mainstream WSS policies’3  that have 
been implemented since the 1980s to reorganize the provision of essential water 
and sanitation services (WSS) worldwide. These policies are part and parcel of the 
process of economic globalization, which has been characterized by the global 
expansion of certain forms of private-sector participation (PSP),4 including that of 
multinational private water monopolies. Two indicators of economic globalization 
in WSS are the significant increase of international investment flows, which rose 
from an estimated 300 million Euros between 1984 and 1990 to 25,000 million 
euros during 1990–1997 (Table  9.1 ), and the number of contracts involving PSP in 
the provision of WSS in developing countries. Table  9.1 shows data for what can 
be considered the peak period of PSP policies in WSS, particularly 1990–1997, 
which is also the time frame covered in our research and discussed here (see 
Appendix, Table A9.2 for the period 1990–2005). 
 As discussed in more detail in the next section, the expansion of PSP in WSS 
is built on several premises, including that (1) publicly-run WSS utilities are 
inherently inefficient and under-resourced, (2) PSP would be inherently more 
efficient in the provision of WSS, (3) PSP would contribute to reduce the public 
sector’s deficit by providing fresh private investment, (4) PSP would reduce 
2
 The chapter draws on the research results of the project “Barriers and Conditions for the 
Involvement of Private Capital and Enterprise in Water Supply and Sanitation in Latin America 
and Africa: Seeking Economic, Social, and Environmental Sustainability” (PRINWASS, European 
Commission 5th Framework Programme, INCO-DEV, Contract: PL ICA4-2001-10041 http://
www.prinwass.org), which studied the implementation of PSP projects in WSS in Africa (Kenya 
and Tanzania), Europe (United Kingdom, Greece) and Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil 
and Mexico) and also included cases of successful public management (Finland). The full list of 
case studies can be consulted in Appendix A-9-1 and we have included all the research reports in 
the reference list. Electronic copies of the project reports, including the individual case-study 
reports, are available by request from the project’s website: http://www.prinwass.org/proreports.
shtml. A discussion of the project methodology and the criteria used to select the case studies can 
be found in the final report, available online at: http://prinwass.ncl.ac.uk/PDFs/PRINWASS%20
D33.zip. 
3
 By “mainstream” water policies we mean the policies of de- and re-regulation, liberalization, 
commodification, and private-sector expansion in WSS that have been the priority of the interna-
tional financial institutions (IFIs) (e.g. World Bank), aid agencies (e.g. USAID), and the govern-
ments of OECD countries since the 1980s. We are aware that there are different approaches within 
this overall policy trend, and that there is no monolithic position even inside the institutions that 
have been at the forefront of these policies. 
4
 We avoid using the concept of “privatization” wherever possible because its use in the literature 
and in public debates often obscures the fact that the private sector has always been involved in 
different forms in the provision of WSS and will continue to do so. Therefore, we choose the 
broader concept of “private-sector participation” to refer to the process in general and restrict the 
use of “privatization” for those specific cases involving the transfer of property rights over water 
sources or water infrastructure to the private sector (e.g. the full divestiture model as implemented 
in England since 1989 to date). 
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political interference and increase transparency, (5) PSP would help to extend 
coverage of services to the poor, and (6) PSP would improve social equity. We 
conclude that the empirical evidence emerging from recent and ongoing research 
does not lend support to these claims.5 Moreover, the chapter argues that main-
stream WSS policy reforms were not driven primarily by the need to solve the 
specific problems affecting these services. From our perspective, these policies 
are part and parcel of the “market-driven politics” characteristic of the political 
project of neoliberal globalization (Leys  2001) , which is aimed at re-centering the 
organization of social life around market principles. The chapter also warns that 
despite increasing rhetorical recognition by the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) and other actors that mainstream WSS policies have failed to achieve their 
stated objectives, in practice the continuation of these initiatives under different 
names and by different means, and the inertial forces unleashed by these policies 
since the 1980s, will continue to negatively influence and shape actual develop-
ments on the ground. Therefore, in the face of the challenge posed by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),6  the chapter concludes that there is an 
urgent need for radical change in policy options away from the explicit or implicit 
promotion of PSP as the solution to the grave problems affecting WSS world-
wide. Efforts should be directed at strengthening public utilities, particularly at 
the regional and local levels, creating opportunities for north-south and south-
south collaboration including supporting the development of public-public part-
nerships, and promoting democratic governance and substantive citizenship in the 
management of water and water services. 
5
 This chapter provides a summary of findings. The reader will find additional details in the origi-
nal project reports listed in the reference list as well as in complementary analyses of the process 
which have been published elsewhere (Castro  2007a,  b,  2008) . 
6
 The MDGs aim at reducing by half the proportion of the global population that lack access to 
WSS by 2015. It is estimated that 17% of the world population lacks access to safe water, and 40% 
has no provision of basic sanitation (UN 2000, 2002). 
 Table 9.1  International investments fl ows involving PSP in WSS, developing and transition 
countries (1984–1997) (Author’s elaboration from DFID  2000) 
 Years 
 Number of 
contracts  Increase (%) 
 Value 
(million) 
 Increase (%) 
 All Developing Countries 
 1984–1990   8     300 
 1990–1997  97  1,137  25,000  7,900 
 Breakdown by region (1990–1997) 
 East Asia  30  12,000 
 Eastern Europe/Central Asia  15   1,500 
 Latin America/Caribbean  40   8,300 
 Middle East/North Africa   4   3,300 
 Sub-Saharan Africa   8      37 
AQ7
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 9.2  The Claims of Mainstream WWS Policies 
 The claims put forward by promoters of PSP as the key solution to the WSS crisis 
are wide-ranging and it is not possible to provide a comprehensive treatment of the 
matter in a single chapter. For this reason we will concentrate here on some aspects 
of what we have identified to be the main justifications used to promote these poli-
cies, as summarized by a World Bank document:
 Private participation offers enormous potential to improve the efficiency of infrastructure 
services, extend their delivery to the poor, and relieve pressure on public budgets that have 
long been the only source of finance. Encouraging more private involvement requires that 
governments change their role–no longer directly providing infrastructure services but 
mastering the new business of fostering competition among private providers, regulating 
where competition is weak, and supporting the private sector generally (World Bank  1998 : 
1; see also Savedoff and Spiller  1999) . 
 In addition, it has also been argued that the expansion of PSP would be the most 
adequate tool “both to meet the UN’s Millennium Development Goals and to 
actively contribute towards social justice the world over” (Balen  2006 : 4; see also 
IDB  1998 :120; World Bank  2006a) . 
 From another angle, authors promoting mainstream WSS policies argue that there 
is no particular reason why WSS should be categorized as a public good 7 that has to 
be excluded from the market (Roth  1988 : 240–2; Triche  1990 : 4), and some have con-
tended that “the argument in favor of direct public provision of [urban water supply] has 
traditionally been based on the false assumption that it is a public good” (Nickson  1996 : 
25), which would have misled people to believe that WSS are “a ‘public service’ or 
even a ‘social good’” (WSP-PPIAF  2002 : 8–10). The neoliberal campaign to erase the 
notion that WSS are public or social goods and reorganize the provision of these ser-
vices as marketable commodities has been recently joined by UNESCO’s World Water 
Assessment Programme, which reserves the status of public good to such activities as 
the protection of the aquatic environment and biodiversity but defines residential water 
supply and sanitation as “private commodities” (UNESCO  2006 : 409). 
 Also, the mainstream literature keeps repeating that “the transfer of public 
[WSS] companies to private ownership can bring substantial improvements in pro-
ductive efficiency” (Lee  1999 : 101), and that “competitive private provision may 
well be the most efficient form of organization for the delivery of water services” 
(Roth  1988 : 7). As already quoted before, the World Bank has officially asserted the 
superiority of private over public provision of WSS (World Bank  1998 : 1). 
Moreover, leading WSS experts at the Bank have openly adopted an extreme free-
AQ1
7
 The notion that essential services such as WSS are “public goods” was developed in the process 
that since the late nineteenth century led first to the increasing regulation of privately-delivered ser-
vices such as water supply and later to municipalization and then state takeover of these services. 
Welfare economists argued that this was necessary because of “market failures,” which arise 
because private markets are unlikely to provide the most efficient pattern of goods and services 
preferred by consumers (Roth, 1987: 6–7). See also Lee  (1999) . 
Ringler_09.indd   166 10/29/2009   2:34:11 PM
1679 Private-Sector Participation in Water and Sanitation Services
BookID 191868_Chap 9_Proof# 1 - 29/10/2009
market position and argued for “complete privatization of water assets” and the 
creation of “unregulated private monopolies” to solve the WSS crisis in developing 
countries (Brook et al.  1998 : 22–23). This call for unregulated provision of WSS has 
also been defended by authors who argue that “privatization seems to be necessary 
but it is not sufficient,” it must be complemented with competition, which if “effec-
tive, […] can replace regulation for network services and thereby increase effi-
ciency” (Newbery  1999 : 386). 
 These and other justifications for expanding PSP in WSS that can be found in 
the mainstream literature led us to formulate a number of research questions: What 
is the historical or empirical evidence to support these arguments? What has been 
the actual result of the implementation of these policies since the late 1980s? What 
lessons can we learn from this process? 
 9.3  Historical Background 
 Regarding the historical evidence, mainstream WSS policies tend to ignore, if not 
even misrepresent, the historical record of the switch from private to public WSS 
provision that took place first in Europe and the United States and then elsewhere 
since the late nineteenth century. A case in point is the misleading reference to the 
situation in nineteenth-century England discussed in the 2004 World Development 
Report of the World Bank. The report dedicates a box to “private participation in 
history” where the authors praise the private monopolies that served London in the 
nineteenth century as successful and even suggest that these private companies 
would have contributed to the universalization of WSS in the city (World Bank 
 2003 : 167). Not only is this a gross historical mistake, but the report fails to men-
tion the fact that the substandard performance of private WSS in nineteenth-century 
England led to the municipalization of the services (Hassan  1998 ; Laski et al.  1935 ; 
Millward  1991) , and, in the case of London, to the takeover of the eight unregulated 
private water monopolies that served the metropolis by a joint board of local 
authorities in 1902 (MWB  1949) . In England, by the late nineteenth century there 
was general acceptance that the achievement of social justice in the provision of 
WSS could not be left to the unregulated working of the market forces and that 
ensuring universal access to clean water and safe disposal of excreta was a moral 
community duty (Luckin  1986 ; Ward  1997 ; Mukhopadhyay  1975 ; Goubert  1986) . 
In consequence, essential services like WSS that had in the past been delivered as 
private commodities (available only to people who could afford to pay for them) 
were reconceptualized as public goods whose provision became a moral responsi-
bility of the state and their universal access became a social right of citizenship. 
Eventually, the achievement of such broad consensus, which was supported even by 
some free-market liberals at the time, led to the universalization of public WSS in 
the country. Similar processes took place elsewhere in Europe including France, the 
country that produced the private companies that today dominate the global market 
of privately-run WSS (Juuti et al.  2006 ; Goubert  1986 ; Pezon  2000) . 
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 The process was similar in the Americas. While in 1806 about 94% of waterworks 
in the United States were private, by 1896, 53% had already been taken over or 
directly built by the public sector, a trend that was especially significant in the largest 
urban centers. Sewerage systems, like in England, were almost exclusively a public 
sector endeavor and their development did not start until the second half of the nine-
teenth century (Hukka and Katko  2003 ; Melosi  2000 ; Ogle  1999 ; Warner  1987 ; 
Schultz and McShane  1978) . The situation in Latin America resembled the experi-
ences of Europe and the United States – private water monopolies that served the 
well-off neighborhoods in the most important cities failed to expand the services to 
cover the growing population and were progressively taken over by the public sector 
since the late nineteenth century (see, e.g., Catenazzi and Kullock  1997 for Argentina; 
Connolly  1997 and Aboites  1998 for Mexico; Pérez-Rincón  2002 for Colombia; 
Swyngedouw  1999,  2004 for Ecuador; Rezende and Heller  2002 for Brazil). 
 Although there is a very rich literature on the history of WSS, mainstream policy 
documents either consistently fail to make any reference to it or tend to misrepre-
sent the actual development. The fact that the universalization of WSS in developed 
countries was only achieved because the public sector intervened in a field previ-
ously run as a for-profit private business is completely ignored and substituted by 
mainstream policy prescriptions. This oversight has been recently acknowledged, 
somewhat reluctantly, by the World Bank, which has admitted that it would be 
wrong to conclude that government should give up and leave everything to the 
private sector. […] If individuals are left to their own devices, they will not provide 
levels of education and health that they collectively desire. […] Not only is this true 
in theory, but in practice no country has achieved significant improvements in child 
mortality and primary education without government involvement. Furthermore, as 
mentioned earlier, private sector or NGO participation in health, education, and 
infrastructure is not without problems – especially in reaching poor people. The 
extreme position is clearly not desirable (World Bank  2003 : 10–11).8 
 Summing up, the historical record does not lend support to the claim that PSP 
can provide the solution to public sector failure in providing universal access to 
WSS in developing countries. 
 9.4  Evidence from Recent and Ongoing Research 
 One of the main claims to promote PSP expansion in WSS has been the need to 
bring fresh private funding to “relieve pressure on public budgets that have long been 
the only source of finance” (World Bank  1998) . However, after mounting evidence 
that the private investments expected from the implementation of mainstream WSS 
policies did not materialize, the World Bank and other actors, including the private 
companies themselves, have recognized that this claim was flawed from the start. As 
8In this passage the World Bank implicitly acknowledged that another claim used to justify PSP, 
that it helps to expand WSS coverage to the poor, is also flawed. We have discussed this particular 
claim in more detail elsewhere (Castro 2007a; also see Laurie 2007).
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stated by Katherine Sierra, the World Bank’s Vice-president of Infrastructure and 
Development during the 2006 Fourth World Water Forum in Mexico:
 Always the bulk of the investment in water has to be provided by the public sector […] 
given the magnitude of the resources needed, in the 1990s we believed that the private sec-
tor could make important investments to save the water sector. However, there has not been 
much private investment and 90% of the resources came from the public sector even during 
the period when private participation was at its height (La Jornada  2006 ; see also World 
Bank,  2003 : 10–11; Klein  2003 ; Hall et al.  2003 : 5–7). 
 Our research found a consistent pattern in the cases studied: actual investment by 
the private companies involved was very modest or even negligible (see Summary 
of findings in Box 4.2). 
 An outstanding example is the case of Aguas Argentinas in Buenos Aires, the 
private concession granted in 1993 to a consortium led by the French company Suez, 
which was eventually cancelled by the Argentinean government in March 2006. As 
shown in Table  9.2 , the actual private investment in this project represented just 
 Table 9.2  Sources of funding – Aguas Argentinas (May 1993–December 2001) (in and %) 
(Elaborated from Azpiazu and Schorr  2004) 
 Source  (millions)  Share 
 Revenues  2,976.5   78.1 
 Net increase of debt    577.4   15.2 
 Fresh capital from partners     98.1    2.6 
 Other financial income    114.5    3.0 
 Other     44.2    1.1 
 Total  3,810.6  100.0 
 US$1 = 0.8171 
 Box 4.2. Economic-financial aspects of PSP: summary 
of findings  
 Revenues from WSS fees – with some variations from case to case – are • 
the most important source of funding for WSS operators, whether public, 
private or mixed Azpiazu and Schorr  (2004) 
 Direct state subsidies and borrowing are the next most important sources • 
of funding; these sources are increasingly becoming a structural compo-
nent in WSS funding 
 “Fresh resources” (genuine private capital) have a significantly lesser role • 
 As a general trend, capital formation has been far lower than expected, • 
with a pattern of recurrent non-compliance of investment commitments 
according to contract 
 There was significant renegotiation of contracts to reduce the original • 
investment commitments of the private company or outright transfer of the 
burden of investment back to the public sector 
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2.6% of the total funding sources of the company between 1993 and 2001. This case 
is significant because it has been praised as a success story and a model to follow as 
recently as in the 2004 World Development Report (World Bank  2003 : 168). The 
example of Aguas Argentinas illustrates the pattern of low or negligible private 
investment in PSP found across the different case studies, although with variations, 
which is also consistent with other research results (see, for instance, Hall  2002, 
 2006 ;  Hall et al.  2004 ; Hukka and Katko  2003) . Moreover, representatives of the 
IFIs and global private water companies have openly acknowledged that the claim 
about fresh private investment did not live up to the expectations (e.g. Aylard  2004 , 
Labre  2004 , see also PRINWASS  2004) . 
 Another claim used to justify mainstream WSS policy is that public utilities 
would be irredeemably wrangled in a vicious circle of inefficiency and could only 
be saved through PSP reforms. As another World Bank-related document argues:
 Publicly-run utilities in developing countries have been singularly unsuccessful in provid-
ing reliable water supply and sanitation services. Most find themselves locked in a down-
ward spiral of weak performance incentives, low willingness to pay by customers, 
insufficient funding for maintenance leading to deterioration of assets, and political inter-
ference. A common reform measure is bringing in the private sector to provide specialized 
expertise, efficient management and new sources of capital (WSP-PPIAF  2002 : 8–10). 
 However, the evidence gathered in this research suggests that when we consider the 
WSS process as a whole, from water intake to wastewater disposal, private utilities 
tend to perform as poorly as the much criticized public entities (Torregrosa et al. 
 2004) . Conversely, the best-performing WSS utilities in the countries studied tend 
to be public and not private companies, such as in Brazil and Mexico.9 In this 
regard, the evidence shows that although private water operators tend to introduce 
significant improvements in commercial efficiency and increase revenue, they also 
tend to under-invest in infrastructure renewal, even failing to comply with invest-
ment commitments agreed upon by contract. Generally, private companies introduce 
significant improvements in user management technologies and infrastructure, such 
as billing and fee collection systems, and also expand water supply coverage to 
include new customers in commercially viable sectors. For instance, in Buenos Aires 
and Cochabamba the expansion of the networks and the investment in asset renewal, 
maintenance, and improvement of service quality was mainly directed to the areas 
offering the greatest profitability (Azpiazu et al.  2003 ; Crespo et al.  2003) . Also, in 
the cases of Brazil (Limeira, Niterói and the Lakes Region), Buenos Aires, and 
Aguascalientes, private companies made substantial progress in improving user 
AQ2
9
 The well-established fact that many public operators in both developing and developed countries 
are highly efficient has been largely ignored or neglected in the mainstream literature as well. For 
instance, after around 15 years of PSP experience in the WSS sector, the best performing utilities 
in Brazil and Mexico are public: SABESP (the state water utility of Sao Paulo) and DMAE (the 
municipal water company of Porto Alegre, in Rio Grande do Sul), among others, in Brazil, and 
the state water company of Nuevo León, SADM, in the case of Mexico. In Colombia, the multi-
utility  Empresas Públicas de Medellín created in 1955, owned by Medellín municipality, is 
another outstanding example of sustained public sector efficiency rarely, if ever, mentioned in the 
mainstream literature (see also Balanyá et al.  2005) . 
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databases, metering consumption, and billing for WSS (Vargas  2003 ; Azpiazu et al. 
 2003 ; Torregrosa et al.,  2003) . The private operations in the Kenyan cases of Nyeri 
and Tala have also reported significant improvements in overall user management, 
from registration to metering and billing (Nyangeri  2003) . 
 Nevertheless, there has been a clear imbalance between the efforts made to 
improve the commercial efficiency of the private companies and enhancing the 
overall efficiency of the systems. This has often led to widespread user dissatisfac-
tion because the rising commercial efficiency in billing and fee collection – 
accompanied by steep increases in water fees – is seldom matched with higher 
service quality. For instance, in Buenos Aires the regulatory body, the Tripartite 
Entity of Sanitation Works and Services (ETOSS), and the Ombudsman had to 
intervene frequently due to spreading user protests against irregularities in the 
implementation of the new user management technologies by the private company 
(e.g. errors in registration and billing, overcharging, unjustified payment orders, 
etc.), which led to the repeated application of fines and other sanctions with some 
cases even reaching the Supreme Court of Justice (Azpiazu et al.  2003) . Another 
example is the case of Aguascalientes, Mexico, where given the poor condition of 
the distribution network that carries a mixture of water and air, improving water 
metering led to an unfair increase in the volume of water/air charged that affected 
the most deprived sectors of the population in particular. According to a survey 
carried out by the municipality one third of the users complained that the private 
company kept invoicing and pressing the collection of fees with disregard for the 
fact that their drinking water supply was intermittent and unreliable (Torregrosa 
et al.  2003) . 
 World Bank analysts have recognized that PSP has had “mixed” results in the 
supply of urban WSS (Richard and Triche  1994 : 4), and that “private sector or 
NGO participation in health, education, and infrastructure is not without problems 
– especially in reaching poor people” (World Bank  2003 : 11). These conclusions 
are consistent with our research findings, which show that the structural social 
inequalities in access to WSS that have existed for decades in developing countries, 
often under public-sector monopoly, are not being reversed, but are rather exacer-
bated by mainstream WSS policies. Private operators need to focus their invest-
ments to secure a return on capital for their shareholders, which is their main 
priority, and therefore expanding the networks to the poor has clearly not been part 
of their strategy, with few exceptions that tend to confirm the rule (Laurie  2007 ; 
UN-United Nations – Habitat  2003 : 180–181). They would, admittedly, only 
expand services to the poor if this is a term of the original contract. However, too 
often companies have not lived up to the letter of the original contracts, particularly 
with regard to infrastructure expansion to cover the most deprived populations. 
Even when the investment requirements are stipulated in the contract, in the 
absence of proper regulation and public control, non-compliance by private provid-
ers has been the pattern in most cases studied. 
10
 It is important to note here that the notion of public or social good does not imply that these 
services should be free of charge, as the two notions are often conflated in current debates. 
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 9.5  From Citizens to Consumers? 
 Another crucial aspect of mainstream WSS policy is the attempt to erase the notion 
that these services are common or social goods that must be provided regardless of the 
market position of the users, that is, regardless of their capacity to pay for them.10  The 
policy aims at rebranding these services, (and we can add all other essential ser-
vices such as public health or basic education) classically conceptualized as social 
goods since the late nineteenth century and enshrined as social rights of citizenship 
since around World War II, as private goods or commodities. Consequently WSS 
users themselves have to be re-categorized: there would be no social right to WSS 
as such, but only the right that can be gained by purchasing them in the market, that 
is, consumer rights. 
 As a note of caution, it is clear that the process of commodification of essential 
services such as safe drinking water has been in progress for decades despite their 
sanctioned status of social rights and public goods, as demonstrated by the well-
known fact that millions of urban poor in developing countries have to buy unsafe 
water from unregulated private vendors at prices several times higher than those 
charged by network WSS utilities in the same city. The exponential growth of the 
bottled water industry, both in developed and developing countries, is another 
example. Nevertheless, the commodification process has been much slower in the 
case of networked WSS, and, as already discussed, one of the explicit objectives of 
mainstream WSS policies has been to move this process forward by accelerating 
the marketization of these services and cancelling the notion that they constitute a 
public good or a universal social right. 
 In doing so, the main efforts of mainstream WSS policy have been focused on 
transforming the identity of the service provider through the process of public-
sector reform and PSP expansion. An important implication of the transition to 
greater PSP has received much less attention: that of transforming the identity of 
the citizen, from a holder of the social right to access WSS as a public good into a 
consumer of commodified WSS and customer of a private provider. Perhaps main-
stream policymakers assumed that the transition would be mechanical and that 
people would simply accept the changes once the PSP-based system of WSS provi-
sion was set in place. However, pro-PSP reformers have been largely oblivious to 
the potential response that these policies would elicit among the population. Thus, 
the introduction of PSP in WSS during the 1990s often took the form of an experi-
ment of social engineering that assumed that values, practices, cultural norms, 
material interests, and social relations associated with water and water services 
could be transformed through legal-institutional changes. 
 For instance, the Mexican government announced in 1993 that “water has ceased to 
be a free good and from now on it is a resource which has an economic value, and 
society must pay for it” (CNA  1993 , p. 11; see also Rogozinski  1993,  1998) . The 
assumption that water in Mexico was free before these reforms is a fallacy, as in practice 
for most Mexicans safe drinking water had already become an expensive commodity 
long ago. More importantly, the assumption that the transformation from “free” to eco-
nomic good can be operated through legal and institutional mechanisms alone is at the 
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heart of the failure experienced by these policies in Mexico and elsewhere. The 
attempted social engineering associated with mainstream WSS policy faces not only the 
specific problems involved in the transformation of water from “public” or “social” 
good into a commodity, but also a wider range of problems prompted by the attempt to 
reduce the often conflicting values and material interests held by different actors regard-
ing the social organization of WSS to a market equivalent. 
 However, this exercise of social engineering has not been successful and the 
attempted commodification of networked WSS has faced significant challenges 
including strong citizen opposition, which, in extreme cases, has led to the cancella-
tion of PSP contracts (e.g. Tucumán in Argentina in 1997, Cochabamba in Bolivia in 
2000, Grenoble in France in 2000, Wales in the UK in 2001, Atlanta in the US in 
2003, Buenos Aires in Argentina [Azurix] in 1999, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania 
in 2005, Buenos Aires in Argentina [Aguas Argentinas] in 2006, and La Paz-El Alto 
in Bolivia in 2006), and even to the prohibition of introducing privatization in WSS 
(e.g. Chaco, Argentina in 1994, and Uruguay in 2004). Awareness or actual experience 
of user unrest caused by the introduction of PSP policies led to the recognition of the 
need for “user involvement” or “participation” to induce public acceptance of these 
policies. Thus, in most cases examined in our study, there was an explicit reference 
to the crucial importance of citizen involvement and participation to ensure the suc-
cess of PSP implementation. Unfortunately, in most cases, this was merely a rhetori-
cal device and meaningful citizen involvement, even in their role as individual 
customers, has been largely neglected in the process. 
 For instance, in Mexico sweeping reforms were introduced in 1992 in the water 
sector seeking to replace the traditional clientelist practices characterizing public 
sector WSS policies by a “new water culture” based on citizen involvement, com-
munity responsibility, and private sector delivery (Castro  2006) . In Bolivia a 
Popular Participation Law was passed in 1994, seeking to promote more citizen 
involvement in local government affairs, which was complemented by the creation 
of an inter-sectoral regulatory framework that allowed for citizen participation in 
the regulation of WSS operators (Crespo et al.  2003) . In the European Union, the 
European Water Framework Directive of 2000, which is being transposed into each 
country’s national legislation, declares that its success “relies on close cooperation 
and coherent action at the community, Member State and local levels as well as on 
information, consultation and involvement of the public, including users” (EU 
 2000) . It would not be difficult to extend the number of examples of this formal 
acknowledgement of the crucial importance of involving citizens and water users 
in WSS projects. Nevertheless, there is overwhelming evidence that in practice, 
citizen involvement, even when citizen roles are reduced to that of customers has 
been highly restricted in most cases, and particularly so in processes involving pro-
PSP reforms in WSS. Let us consider a selection of examples. 
 The case of Cochabamba is the only one among our case studies where the rights 
over water resources were at stake, when the new water law passed in 1999 and the 
concession granted to a private consortium in the same year threatened to expropri-
ate the existing water rights of the indigenous farmers of the Cochabamba Valley. 
In fact, indigenous water rights, based on what is locally known as “uses 
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and customs,” were neglected in the relevant policy reforms carried out in Bolivia 
during the 1990s such as the Basic Sanitation Plan (1992–2000). Moreover, by 
transferring all water rights to the private company, including those abstraction 
rights previously in the hands of Cochabamba’s municipal operator SEMAPA, the 
expropriation would have extended to the whole community, which owns the water 
rights through the municipal body. This was one of the key reasons for the mass 
mobilization that led to the cancellation of the private concession less than a year 
into the contract, in March 2000 (Crespo et al.  2003) . 
 In Bolivia, the institutional framework for user participation has been limited to 
creating formal channels for the presentation of complaints and appeals about ser-
vice deficiencies and grievances. There is also a provision by which the regulator 
has the power to call public audiences for consulting users on particular issues. In 
general, these instruments have not helped to promote meaningful citizen involve-
ment, as showed by the fact that a public audience held in Cochabamba in December 
1999 to consult users over the tariff increases to be implemented by the private 
concessionaire attracted only 14 participants. Although the regulator was supposed 
to act in defense of users’ interests, the prevailing perception among the population 
was that the interest of the private water operator was receiving priority over those 
of the community (Crespo et al.  2003) . These feelings were further accentuated 
because the municipality was also left out of the discussion over the tariff increases, 
effectively curtailing the only other mechanism available to citizens for exercising 
control over the process. Moreover, people had been alienated from the start, as the 
process leading to the granting of the concession had been conducted with complete 
disregard for citizens’ preferences and opinions, in conditions of secrecy whereby 
essential information such as the contractual obligations and the financial plans of 
the private operator were hidden from public scrutiny through a confidentiality 
clause included in the contract (Crespo et al.  2003) . 
 In Argentina, most concessions to private companies made during the 1990s 
were carried out by bypassing the congress (through the issue of special presiden-
tial “Decrees of Necessity and Urgency”) and avoiding public consultation or citi-
zen involvement, such as the 1993 case of Aguas Argentinas in Buenos Aires. 
Moreover, concessions were granted in the absence of any anti-monopoly legisla-
tion, specific regulatory bodies or consumer representation. In the case of Buenos 
Aires, successive renegotiations of the original concession contract followed the 
same model favoring the private company’s interests over the public. In the extreme, 
even the regulator ETOSS was excluded from crucial negotiations in 1997 when the 
body tried to exercise some degree of control given the overt lack of compliance by 
the private company with its contractual obligations in relation to investment com-
mitments (Azpiazu et al.  2003) . 
 Another crucial aspect affecting citizen participation in Buenos Aires is the 
monopolization of the production of, access to, and use of vital information about 
the running of the water utility by the private operator, which resulted in both the 
regulators and the users’ organizations being dependent on the information released 
by the company, which left little room for independent assessment and monitoring. 
The role of users’ organizations was only defined after the concession was granted 
and it was limited to presenting legal and administrative complaints. After a review 
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of the role of users in the face of mounting citizen unrest in the late 1990s, user 
involvement remained severely restricted and it was mainly limited to people’s 
engagement as providers of labor and materials for the expansion of the network in 
poor neighborhoods, a program that was jointly developed by the private company 
and the local office of an international NGO (UN-United Nations – Habitat  2003 : 
176). Although these forms of “civil society” engagement were obviously a step 
forward from the alienation that users suffered in the original concession contract, 
they still had little say on crucial aspects of the governance of WSS, especially 
regarding decisions about who governs the system, how, at what cost, and for the 
benefit of whom. Eventually, the private concession was terminated by the 
Argentinean government in 2006 on grounds of the alleged failure of the private 
operator to comply with the contractual commitments. 
 In the case of Tucumán, the overall process leading to the concession of the pub-
lic utility in 1995 was marred from the start by lack of transparency and widespread 
suspicion of corruption of public officers and politicians. The negotiations were car-
ried out in the absence of public debate or even consultation, and citizens were also 
excluded from the activities of control and regulation foreseen in the regulatory 
framework and the licensing contract. However, in sharp contrast with the case of 
Buenos Aires, the authoritarian character of the process in the end resulted in the 
early collapse of the concession. The increase of 106% applied to water bills shortly 
after the private operator took control of the service provoked widespread unrest 
among water users and prompted the organization of a wide-ranging front of opposi-
tion through a “refusal to pay” campaign that was joined by municipal authorities, 
provincial legislators, and workers who had been laid off by the private company. In 
addition, problems with the quality of water being delivered and the extremely high 
temperatures of the summer of 1995–1996 compounded the situation and the protest 
movement grew rapidly to the point that 86% of the users, including businesses and 
government departments joined in the civil disobedience by refusing to pay their 
water bills (Crenzel  2003) . 
 In the three case studies carried out in Brazil, Limeira, Niterói, and the Lakes 
Region, the pattern was very similar: the processes leading to the granting of the 
concessions were marred by political controversy, allegations of corruption, and 
long litigations in the judicial system. Against this background, it is possible to 
perhaps understand why the former Director of the World Bank’s Brazilian office, 
Vinod Thomas, declared in late 2003 that “when there is risk that privatization 
might create a monopoly, it is better to leave the services in State hands. … [He 
referred] to the case of Russia, a country that in the last few years has had one of 
the worst performances in social terms, as an example of privatization processes 
that should have never happened” (Folha de Sao Paulo  2003). Similar problems 
were already affecting the process of PSP expansion in Brazil. A common trait in 
the Brazilian cases is secrecy involving contracts, especially the lack of informa-
tion about issues such as the authorized rates of return on investment or the details 
of the committed investment and financial plans, which renders regulatory moni-
toring and public scrutiny unfeasible (Vargas  2003) . 
 Conversely, there have also been important examples of what may happen when 
citizens are meaningfully involved in the decision making process or local authorities 
AQ3
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have some degree of autonomy to decide between alternative possibilities, free 
from the pressure to introduce PSP coming from loan conditionalities or the impo-
sition of mainstream WWS policies by the national governments. One such instance 
took place in the province of Chaco, in Argentina, when in 1994 the provincial 
government called for public consultation on the acceptability of introducing PSP 
in the running of public services, WSS included. Voters massively rejected the PSP 
option and decided to keep public services in public hands. This result of the con-
sultation, which was legally binding, took the political establishment by surprise 
since the most important political parties supported, or at least did not challenge, 
the federal government’s far-reaching program of PSP expansion at the time. This 
decision was inscribed in the provincial constitution, which as a result forbade the 
introduction of PSP in its territory. Unfortunately for Chaco, the democratic deci-
sion taken by the citizens was punished by the federal government, which excluded 
the province from the national funding scheme for WSS infrastructure, partially 
funded by the Inter American Development Bank, as access to funding was condi-
tional on introducing PSP in WSS (Roze  2003) . 
 Other examples of what may happen when citizens have the opportunity to voice 
their opinions are provided by the participatory processes implemented in several 
Brazilian cities, such as Porto Alegre and Recife. The case of Porto Alegre is much 
better known as a successful example of citizen participation in the organization of 
public services (World Bank  2003 : 42). Porto Alegre’s Municipal Department for 
Water and Sewerage (DMAE), an autonomous municipal utility created in 1961, is 
one of the best WSS providers in Brazil. Since the 1990s DMAE became repeatedly 
the target for the introduction of PSP. The reasons for this pressure were not the 
need to improve infrastructure efficiency, relieve public sector budgets or expand 
the services to the poor, as the DMAE was self-sufficient, and had already achieved 
high standards of efficiency and coverage. The main reasons were political, as the 
federal government was pushing an aggressive policy of PSP expansion with the 
support of IFIs like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The main instruments of this policy 
were the new Concessions Law passed in 1995 by the government of President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and the Modernization Program for Water and 
Sanitation Services (PMSS) implemented by the federal government with World 
Bank funding. In this context, DMAE was approached systematically by represen-
tatives of the IFIs with offers of loans for financing infrastructure renewal and 
expansion always on the condition that the utility should be open to PSP. These 
offers, which, at times, allegedly took the form of bribing attempts, were consis-
tently rejected by DMAE’s authorities who aimed to keep the company in public 
hands, thanks to the high level of political and public support they held locally.11 
11
 Interview with Eng. Atílio Todeschini, former Director of DMAE and currently elected municipal 
councillor, Chamber of Councillors of Porto Alegre, Porto Alegre, January 2005. The “bribing 
attempts” refer to situations where allegedly officers of the IFIs were trying to negotiate loans in 
exchange for consultancy contracts for private companies run by themselves, family relatives or 
friends. This reminds us of Joseph Stiglitz’s statement that privatization as promoted by the IFIs 
should be rather termed “briberization” (Stiglitz,  2002 : 58). 
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 In Recife, capital of the state of Pernambuco, since 1995, the state’s Water and 
Sanitation Company (COMPESA) became a target for the PSP program fostered by 
the federal government. By 1999/2000 preparations for launching a bid were 
already well advanced with the agreement of the federal, state, and municipal gov-
ernments and with support from the World Bank through the PMSS. In addition, a 
loan being negotiated with the World Bank for investment in basic infrastructure in 
the Recife Metropolitan Area was also tied up to the condition that COMPESA 
become open to PSP. However, the unexpected electoral success of an alliance led 
by the Workers’ Party (PT) in Recife and other important municipalities of the 
metropolis changed the dynamic of the process, as the PT won the election with a 
program that opposed mainstream PSP policies in public services. In 2002, the 
municipal government of the capital organized Recife’s First Municipal Conference 
on Water and Sanitation, opening the debate about the future of public services in 
the city – together with other crucial topics – in a highly participatory process 
which led to a massive vote in favor of keeping public services, including WSS, in 
public hands. Faced with the outcome of the Conference, and with the determina-
tion of the municipal authorities to keep their campaign promises, the state gover-
nor agreed to freeze the bidding process. Nevertheless, further pressure was put on 
the municipal government to accept the introduction of PSP in the state utility 
COMPESA through the conditions included in the loan negotiated with the World 
Bank for the recuperation of degraded areas of the city. It was only after very dif-
ficult negotiations carried out in Brazil and Washington, and after the intervention 
of the federal government of Brazil, that the Bank’s negotiators agreed to withdraw 
the conditionality of PSP from the loan contract as requested by Recife’s municipal 
authorities.12 
 These are very relevant examples of what may happen when people are given a 
meaningful opportunity to participate and express their preferences and this is 
combined with a minimum degree of autonomy for the local authorities and 
regional governments. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, this has been seldom 
the case in the mainstream policies promoting PSP in the water sector. It can be 
argued that although rhetorically social participation has been recognized as a 
crucial factor in ensuring the success of WSS policy reforms (EC  2002,  2003 ; 
GWP  2002,  2003 ; UNDP  2003) , the prevailing practices continue to alienate and 
exclude rather than include citizens in the government and management of these 
services. 
 It is important, however, to place this critique in historical perspective. It must 
be recognized that citizen participation has not been a characteristic of the ways in 
which water and WSS have been governed and managed in the past. As pointed out 
12
 Interview with Eng. Antônio da Costa Miranda Neto, former Secretary of Sanitation of the 
Municipality of Recife and International Representative of the Brazilian Association of Municipal 
Water and Sanitation Utilities (ASSEMAE), Recife, 12 December 2003. We have omitted the 
details of the negotiations for reasons of space, but the interview provided good evidence of the 
strength with which IFIs use loan conditionalities to foster PSP policies in developing countries. 
The final negotiations for this project, called Prometrópole, took place in Washington in November 
2002, and the contract was finally signed on 23 June 2003. 
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by John Dryzek, in the tradition of administrative rationalism, the highly techno-
cratic model of public service delivery that prevailed during much of the twentieth 
century and that has been the target of the public sector reforms since the 1980s, 
the organizing principle was “leave it to the experts” – citizens were expected to be 
passive and obedient beneficiaries (Dryzek  1997) . However, it must also be recog-
nized that in the policies mainstreamed since the 1980s, opportunities for substan-
tive citizen participation are limited. 
 Citizen “participation” often means willingness to accept decisions already 
taken with little or no consultation. This is not a new problem, and in most cases it 
could be observed that social struggles for the democratization of water governance 
are long standing, as vividly illustrated by the experiences of the Latin American 
countries examined here. Despite a limited degree of success achieved during the 
1980s through the experience of decentralization in some countries, the persistence 
of paternalistic and authoritarian political arrangements continue to hinder the pos-
sibilities for deepening the exercise of substantive citizenship and democratic gov-
ernance. Unfortunately, the expansion of PSP promoted by mainstream WSS has 
tended to exacerbate existing problems and even create new ones, raising the level 
of citizen contestation and unrest, as reflected in the declining acceptance of PSP 
policies found by the Latinobarómetro opinion poll (see Table  9.3 ). 
 The results of expansion of PSP have been often catastrophic for poor countries, 
particularly if we think in terms of the missed opportunities for achieving the 
 Table 9.3  Declining public support for PSP in Latin America a (1998–2003) (Lagos  2004) 
 Country  1998  2002  2003 
 Costa Rica  60  32  – 
 Brazil  51  38  33 
 Venezuela  51  38  32 
 Mexico  49  28  31 
 Chile  51  22  29 
 Honduras  47  34  25 
 Colombia  39  23  24 
 Paraguay  46  19  23 
 Peru  44  32  22 
 Ecuador  52  40  20 
 Nicaragua  46  30  20 
 Bolivia  49  23  19 
 Guatemala  62  29  16 
 Uruguay  29  16  16 
 El Salvador  54  35  15 
 Argentina  32  14  12 
 Panama  20  31  10 
 Latin America  46  28  22 
 
a
 Percentage of positive responses to the question: “Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, some-
what disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following phrases that I am going to read: The 
privatization of state companies has been beneficial to the country.” The table only shows results 
for the responses “Strongly Agree” and “Somewhat Agree.” 
Ringler_09.indd   178 10/29/2009   2:34:11 PM
1799 Private-Sector Participation in Water and Sanitation Services
BookID 191868_Chap 9_Proof# 1 - 29/10/2009
MDGs in cases like Bolivia .13 The experience has been also catastrophic for some 
private operators that have ventured into the program of PSP expansion with very 
limited knowledge and understanding of the local socio-political and cultural con-
ditions. As a recent assessment by the Executive Vice-President of Suez put it:
 I would like to have a brief look back at 2002 and 2003, whose disastrous results shook our 
convictions to the core: The overly hasty expansion of water internationally ended in fail-
ures that were painful for all of us; ONDEO and SITA’s acquisitions of companies that 
should have been sources of growth instead generated losses or were a cause for concern. 
We were forced to pull out of unprofitable projects (Puerto Rico, Atlanta, etc.) and to sell 
part or all of companies such as Northumbrian and Cespa, whose development we were no 
longer able to finance. This sorely tried our nevertheless proven business models and our 
certainties. (Chaussade  2004) 
 This experience of business failure is shared by others, to the point that the global 
water operators announced their retreat from developing countries. In the words of 
an analyst, “Can anyone imagine investing hard currency in water projects in coun-
tries like the Philippines, Argentina and Bolivia now?” (GWI  2004) . This question 
provides insight into the assessment that global water companies have made about 
the role that they can play in helping developing countries to achieve the MDGs. It 
also provides mutatis mutandi, a contribution to our own evaluation of the claims 
made in mainstream WSS policies about the role of the private sector in solving 
public failures in developing countries. 
 9.6  Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented some of the key findings and conclusions on mainstream 
WSS policies implemented worldwide since the 1990s. The empirical evidence 
derived from our study does not support the claims that PSP can provide the solution 
to protracted public sector failures, especially in developing countries. These exam-
ples suggest that most of the arguments used to justify the expansion of PSP are either 
flawed, like the claims that PSP can provide the needed investment by tapping private 
sources of funding or that it can be the best strategy to expand services to the unserved 
poor, or grossly exaggerated, as PSP does not necessarily produce higher levels of 
overall efficiency in the provision of WSS. When we observe the whole cycle of the 
AQ4
13
 An important calculation that is often missing in the debates is the cost of introducing PSP in 
developing countries: the cost in terms of the preparation of public utilities for privatization. In 
addition to this, in cases like Bolivia, the failed PSP contracts in Cochabamba (2000) and more 
recently in La Paz–El Alto (2006) have placed a heavy burden on the country, given that the private 
operators have sued the Bolivian government to claim compensation for the loss of future revenues 
over the remaining life of the contracts. A similar situation is faced by Argentina in relation to a 
number of failed PSP contracts and the country currently faces compensation claims from private 
companies that run in the hundreds of millions of dollars (for a discussion on arbitration tribunals 
created under international investment agreements, see Solanes, this volume). 
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production and distribution of WSS from intake to safe wastewater disposal, private 
operators tend to fair poorly while there are excellent examples of highly efficient and 
well managed public companies. While private operators tend to concentrate their 
investments on enhancing the commercial aspects of the business (e.g. metering and 
expanding coverage for drinking water), they often neglect much needed investment 
in infrastructure renewal and in the overall management of wastewater. There is no 
evidence in our cases that private operators pay adequate attention to demand man-
agement initiatives, environmental planning, or integrated management of natural 
resources – that are core components of sustainability strategies – even when these 
activities are stipulated by contract or otherwise subject to strict regulation. 
 In historical perspective, rather than being driven by a genuine search for effi-
ciency improvements and universalization of service access, mainstream PSP policies 
form part of a pendular cycle between private and public-sector expansion that has 
been closely intertwined with transformations in the socioeconomic structures of the 
leading capitalist countries. While during much of the twentieth century, and espe-
cially since the post Second World War period, the state was given a central role as 
the key economic actor, by the early 1970s, significant changes in the global economy 
completely transformed the relative weight of the state vis-a-vis other actors, in par-
ticular the trans-nationalized private sector. One of the most significant consequences 
of WSS policies inspired by free-market liberalism, has been the attempt to radically 
transform the structure of governance of WSS, which had traditionally been devel-
oped around the principle that these are essential services that should be universally 
available and, therefore provided under strict public sector control or directly by the 
public sector. Under the conditions prevailing internationally since the 1980s, attempts 
have been made to reorganize the governance of WSS around market principles, 
reducing state control over private operators to a minimum and transforming the 
status of WSS from essential public services into commodities. 
 However, this has not been a linear process and has not produced a uniform 
model. Despite some common “megatrends” (e.g. the monopolization of the private 
water market by a handful of multinational operators, mainly European) we have 
also found differences and diversity in policies and strategies between and within 
countries and regions. Even within the key institutions that have promoted the 
model since the 1980s, like the World Bank, there exist internal tensions and debate 
which have produced a diversity of outcomes. While during the 1990s critics of the 
model (for instance, within the Bank) were few and their voices very moderate, 
since 2002 the dissent has been more open and pronounced. Finally, in its World 
Development Report 2004 and further public statements the World Bank has openly 
admitted that mainstream WSS policy, in the face of the challenges assumed by the 
international community in relation to the MDGs, cannot be grounded on a market-
centered structure of governance and that the private sector cannot be considered to 
be the main actor for universalizing WSS in developing countries. 
 In hindsight, it is clear that these changes may be related to the recurrent failures 
experienced by projects involving private-sector participation in WSS during the 
1990s, and to the increasing reluctance of private water companies to engage in the 
provision of WSS in developing countries owing to the financial and political risks 
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involved. Although private operators may be willing to undertake the provision of 
these services under conditions that guarantee a sustained return for their share-
holders, countries cannot rely on PSP for the expansion and maintenance of WSS 
to the large population in developing countries who have limited or no access to 
these services. These are normally the poorer sectors of society, in which a large 
proportion of the population lives in extreme poverty and can barely afford to pay 
for WSS at the true international market price (and often not even at their cost-
recovery price), and whose situation has been systematically worsened throughout 
the 1990s owing to increasing inequality and deprivation (Crenzel and Forte  2004 ; 
Wade  2004 ; Perry et al.  2003 ; IDB  1998) . 
 Furthermore, the long standing tradition of limiting or excluding citizen involve-
ment in the provision of WSS (whether publicly or privately organized) continues, 
despite recent rhetoric that civil participation has become a key element in current 
WSS policy programs. This is particularly true in developing countries, but it can 
also be detected in developed countries. In the extreme, the absence of channels for 
adequate citizen involvement (or the actual violation of the right to meaningful citi-
zen participation and monitoring) has led to bitter confrontations in many cases 
involving increased PSP since the 1980s. Such confrontations have led to the col-
lapse of concessions, violence, political crisis, destruction of property and, most 
regrettably, the loss of human life, such as in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000. 
 As a result of the failures and of the contentious situations created, promoters of 
(for-profit) PSP increasingly recognize the need to take into account socio-political 
and cultural conditions when designing water and sanitation policies. This change 
has been reflected in new programs to develop “partnerships” between the private 
sector and other actors, especially “public-private partnerships” and “tri-partite 
partnerships” (between the public, private, and voluntary sectors). However, unaware-
ness or even disregard for socio-political and cultural processes continues to be a 
crucial factor in the large number of highly controversial experiences and failures 
recorded. In many cases, this has led to bitter conflicts and to the collapse or early 
abortion of programs involving PSP (especially with foreign private operators) in 
the provision of WSS. In the institutional dimension, the weakness or absence of 
adequate legislation and regulatory frameworks has been a recurrent problem in the 
cases studied, which is confirmed by research carried out by peers (e.g. Hall  2002, 
 2006 ; Hall et al.  2003,  2004 ; Hukka and Katko  2003) . Some case countries have 
reformed legislation (e.g. water laws) to facilitate the expansion of PSP in WSS in 
ways that showed little regard for important considerations such as ecological sus-
tainability (e.g. water resources conservation) and socio-political accountability 
(e.g. mechanisms to protect citizens’ rights in their role as users of WSS). In most 
developing-country cases PSP was introduced in the absence of any regulatory 
structures and institutions, while little attention has been paid to local capacity 
building in the public sector to strengthen institutional capabilities for regulation 
and control. As a rule PSP contracts for WSS have been kept away from public 
scrutiny, and crucial information needed for effective monitoring of compliance by 
private operators is not available in the public domain (it is considered the private 
property of the companies). 
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 At the heart of the problem, there is a confrontation between alternative models 
of governance, structured around competing principles, which in the current histori-
cal stage have taken the form of a confrontation between a revival of market-
centered governance against the pre-existing model of state-centered governance 
that had prevailed in the WSS sector for most of the twentieth century. One of the 
crucial questions this study addressed is whether the theoretical, historical, and 
empirical evidence supports the notion that the failure of state-centered governance 
in the WSS of most developing countries could be solved by radically transferring 
the role of the state to private monopolists. This study found scant historical support 
for this argument. New evidence produced by the most recent wave of PSP in the 
water and sanitation sector strongly disproves claims that chronic WSS problems 
facing developing countries can be resolved by relying on the private sector. This 
suggests that achieving the MDGs will not be possible by relying on the private 
sector, which is accepted even by the private global water companies. 
 Nevertheless, this has been a highly dynamic process, with frequent changes in 
direction and a very unclear horizon in terms of where the system will move next. 
On the one hand, despite the arrogant neglect of citizen preferences and opinions, 
especially but not only in poor developing countries, there has been mounting dis-
satisfaction and open defiance to the PSP policies in many countries. It would be a 
mistake to characterize this opposition as a mere rejection of market policies or 
PSP; in fact, there was some degree of support among important sectors in the early 
1990s in countries like Argentina. However, lack of participation in decisionmaking 
and implementation, widespread perception of public and private corruption in the 
negotiation of concession contracts, and increasing evidence that the PSP model 
privileges the interests of the private operators rather than the needs of communi-
ties, contributed to the observed marked decline in acceptance or least tolerance of 
PSP and to the explosion of public protest, civil disobedience, and even violence 
against these policies. 
 From another angle, despite the promotion of PSP in WSS during the 1990s, the 
actual impact of these policies has been rather modest and private water companies 
today still serve less than 10% of the world population (Hall et al.  2004 : 25; 
UN-United Nations – Habitat  2003 : 177, 178). Even in the United States, whose 
government is one of the world champions in the promotion of PSP, only 15% of the 
population is served by private companies and this proportion is unlikely to increase 
in the future according to a government-commissioned report (NRC  2002) . 
Developing countries that in the 1990s became the leading experimental field for 
neoliberal WSS policies, like Argentina, where between 1991 and 1999 the propor-
tion of the population served by private WSS utilities increased to around 70 %14 , 
have started an accelerated process to place WSS back in public hands as a conse-
quence of PSP failing to deliver the promised goods. Similar trends can be identi-
fied elsewhere in both developing and developed countries, while several countries 
have even banned the privatization of WSS at the national level (e.g. Uruguay, 
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Sweden, The Netherlands). It is not surprising, therefore, that some analysts have 
argued that the PSP debate has been blown out of proportion (Budds and 
McGranahan  2003 : 88). Although this is true, there is a danger in playing down the 
significance of the forces unleashed by mainstream policies since the 1980s, as 
their impact may have far-reaching negative consequences for years to come inde-
pendently of the degree of actual PSP expansion. In particular, the process of trans-
forming the status of WSS (and other essential services such as health and 
education) from public or social goods into marketable commodities and cancelling 
the rights of citizens by reducing their role to mere consumers is taking place inde-
pendently of PSP expansion. This is because the policy of reform is also imple-
mented in public utilities, which are pressed to reorganize WSS on the basis of 
commercial principles and adopt market efficiency criteria, abandoning the notion 
that these services are public goods that must be universally available indepen-
dently of the market status of the users. Moreover, despite a rhetoric of change, IFIs 
and other mainstream actors continue to push the expansion of PSP under different 
forms and names, disregarding lessons learned from recent experiences. 
 Some key lessons can be drawn from the recent experience with PSP in WSS in 
order to think ahead and contribute to the construction of feasible alternatives. Such 
alternatives should prioritize social rights and the common good over market inter-
ests.15 As in the past, policies embracing these principles would be accepted and 
supported by a wide range of social and political forces, even by sectors that in 
other respects defend free-market liberalism but recognize that the universal provi-
sion of WSS requires different arrangements. Achieving success in the design and 
implementation of present and future WSS policies and meeting the UN Millennium 
Development Goals can only happen through the amalgamation of a broad and 
universalistic alliance of social forces to foster a new vision for defending the com-
mon good. This process is already taking place, and should be supported by 
strengthening local capacity, fostering public-public cooperation and partnership, 
and consolidating the substantive democratization of the governance and manage-
ment of water and water services. 
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